Is There a Human Right to Democracy?
In an increasingly globalized world where full democracy seems to be a goal for all societies, one either set by domestic agencies and the people or by the international society of all societies, the true meaning and benefits of democracy must be explored. Democracy has come to mean more than its antiquated definition developed in Ancient Greece. Then, the dogma sought to give people power in governance by obliging free men to serve in the institution for a period of time. Nowadays, democracy is touted as a concept related to a better standard of living, a dissemination of knowledge throughout society, and a peaceful and cooperative outlook on foreign affairs. Charles Tilly in his book on democracy sees it as an outcome of its related process, democratization. Democratization, he argues, is achieved through three proceedings: integration of trust networks in the political regime, the abolition of categorical inequality on the basis of race, gender, or religion, and lastly the dilution of coercive autonomous power centers (Tilly). Human rights, on the other hand, are a set of inalienable, indivisible, and universal rights to which we are all entitled by the virtue of being human. They are often represented by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights but can take more abstract forms. They are frequently considered an ideology, which is important as they justify and embody the moral beliefs of societies. On this basis, the essay will discuss the evolution of democracy critically, as well as look at the different paradoxes in the application of democracy at the international level, which would be required if it were to become a human right.
Despite the universal quality of human rights, this ideology is not always realistically reflected. Many have developed a perception of democracies, such as those found in the European Union, the US, Canada, or Australia, as the guardians of human rights at the domestic level and beyond. Even though their independent judiciary systems protect citizens, they often fail to recognize the human rights of those not part of the “demos,” such as prisoners who are mistreated in Guantanamo Bay by the US, refugees who are neglected by Australia in its offshore detention camps, or stateless persons who are often denied human rights as there is no state power to protect them. Because human rights are indivisible and thus must be viewed as one body of law where no article is more important than another, the tensions between democracy and human rights can be detrimental to their protection. An example that demonstrates this tension is the referendum for banning the building of minarets in Switzerland. Through a democratic “opinion-building and decision-making process” (Kirchschlaeger), the people of Switzerland voted for the ban “with a clear majority of 57.5 percent” (Erlanger). In this case, the right to democracy and the right to vote guaranteed by the Swiss government, seems to violate human rights such as the freedom of belief and the freedom from discrimination which the government has also vowed to respect. Furthermore, questions about the inclusivity of this democratic process arise as the views of minority religious communities may not have been presented fairly in national debates prior to the referendum.
Looking beyond these tensions between human rights and democracy, one must recognize that democracy is fundamentally built as a system that upkeeps human rights. Therefore, many democracies do actively take measures to secure human rights. Examples of such measures that uphold the protection of human rights in democratic processes include the expectation of a codified constitution, and a separation of powers that allows the traditional executive, judiciary, and legislative powers to maintain checks and balances and remain unbiased. In the case of Switzerland and its ban on minarets, the aforementioned measures did not impede the ban. Other mechanisms such as Switzerland’s foreign policy which is faithful to neutrality, reflecting a commitment to democracy as it does not allow for foreign affairs to destabilize the country’s democracy can be of concern. Its commitment to neutrality has led Switzerland to democratically ratify the European Convention on Human Rights which allows the European Court of Justice to overrule national laws if they infringe on human rights.
However, another argument is that these international institutions have corroded and encroached the state’s sovereignty to impose laws. This means that the democratic states can no longer determine what is best for themselves, in fact, citizens are excluded from all decision-making as it takes place transnationally. This is often called democratic deficit and ultimately threatens the people’s allegiance to democratic institutions which can already be seen through the rise in right-wing populist movements. Moreover, the movement of power from the nation-state towards global institutions, although it can avoid corruption and promote certain humanitarian values, also means imposing values and beliefs onto societies which is quite undemocratic in nature. This is especially problematic as global institutions such as the World Bank, the World Trade Organization, or the International Monetary Fund seem to have prioritized the interests, values, and beliefs of Western states above others. It can be argued that poorer countries do not have equitable positions as they have fewer financial means and political power to participate in debates and policy-setting. One can additionally argue that democracy itself has been re-shaped into a Western ideal, consisting of liberalism and the ballot box, which not all peoples may choose to endorse. This is understandable because, as Amartya Sen has shown, it is “public reasoning” and toleration that are the features of democracy that have truly global roots.
Examining John Rawls’ ideas in his short book on global justice, The Law of Peoples, he holds that democratic principles of liberal societies need not be imposed on so-called decent societies that are not liberal but respect human rights. Even though this may seem like a conservative approach, Rawls bases his theory on liberal principles applied to the transnational level. In his theory, a state gains decency when it protects a limited number of human rights, namely the right to sustenance, security, free conscience, individual property, and finally freedom from slavery. Furthermore, these decent societies are characterized by non-aggressive foreign policy which resembles that of – ideally conceived –liberal societies. Hence, Rawls argues that even though democracy is not present, these decent societies have a common conception of good And if we were to introduce democracy as a human right, it would inherently imply that non-democratic societies cannot protect the existing set of human rights. Through this assumption, the international society of governments would be discriminating against non-democratic states. In addition, imposing a right to democracy could be seen as an infringement on autonomy and self-determination of a nation as liberal hegemonies grow stronger in the international world order. And finally, another important problem with insisting that there should be a human right to democracy, highlighted by Pevnick (p. 40), is the fact that it discourages experimentation of new political systems.
“Representative democracy is itself a historically recent constellation of political institutions. Such systems were invented in the revolutions of the eighteenth century and only widely expanded in an egalitarian manner in the years following World War II. Their design and implementation were, in an important sense, a kind of political experiment.”
Thus, why should we assume that this system cannot be outperformed, especially at a time when non-democratic states like Singapore have proven to be non-aggressive and respectful of human rights?
On the other hand, democracy is instrumental in realizing human rights. As Christiano explains, “minimally egalitarian democracy causes a significant decrease in violations of human rights to personal integrity, suggesting that democracy brings about the protection of these rights” (Christiano, p.153). If statistical probability to guarantee human rights is the determining factor, imposing this type of governance would make sense; however, this would be undemocratic, conservative, and constrictive in terms of diversity of expression. And yet another argument for the introduction of democracy as a human right is that it could result in a peaceful state of affairs that democracy promotes among democratic societies. Democracies have less of a propensity to engage in war, especially between each other. This is arguably due to strong ties that develop between democratic states as they trade, cooperate, and engage in multilateral diplomacy. Since war has historically been seen as a catalyst for alarming human rights violations such as genocide and an overall lack of justice, democracy can be seen as an effective tool towards a more just international setting.
In conclusion, it can be argued that non-democratic states can be peaceful and guarantee human rights, thus posing no threat to international order, and creating no need for a human right to democracy. Although the instrumental argument for the right to democracy is important to consider, it cannot be the basis for instituting such a right. The international community can request for states to respect human rights, but not request that it follows a system that has shown a tendency to promote them. However, it must be noted that the international community can promote democracy as it is true that derived from statistics, democracies have a stronger reputation for promoting human rights and, at times, better standards of living. Instead of enacting a rule that constrains societies, democracy can be promoted. A viable option is through assistance programs or trade and cooperation. Rawls claims that these measures empower non-democratic societies and helps them move towards a more liberal structure as they recognize the benefits of liberal institutions.
Bibliography:
Christiano, Thomas. “An Instrumental Argument for a Human Right to Democracy.” Philosophy & Public Affairs, vol. 39, no. 2, Wiley, 2011, pp. 142–76, http://www.jstor.org/stable/41301866.
Erlanger, Steven. “Swiss Ban Building of Minarets on Mosques.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 29 Nov. 2009, https://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/30/world/europe/30swiss.html.
Kirchschlaeger, Peter. “The Relation between Democracy and Human Rights.” Social Studies, 2014, https://www.sociostudies.org/almanac/articles/the_relation_between_democracy_and_human_rights/.
Pevnick, Ryan. “The Failure of Instrumental Arguments for a Human Right to Democracy.” Journal of Political Philosophy, vol. 28, no. 1, Mar. 2020, pp. 27–50. EBSCOhost, doi-org.proxy.aup.fr/10.1111/jopp.12197.
Rawls, John. The Law of the Peoples. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999.
Sen, Amartya Kumar. Development as Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
Tilly, Charles. Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
