Women’s Reproductive Rights and the Labor Market
Your car won’t start? Pay the mechanic, and have it fixed immediately. Your kitchen drain is clogged? Hire a plumber, and have it cleared out today. Your fence is scratched up? Call a painter, and have it look good as new this week. In need of a baby? Find a surrogate, and have it delivered in nine months. Recent years have seen heavy debate over the ethics surrounding the inclusion of women’s reproductive labor within the labor market. A reliance on surrogacy has become increasingly prevalent, as same sex, disabled, and single prospective parents seek out women’s reproductive labor as a means of having a child. This contractual exchange can be seen as “win-win:” the buyer receives a child and the seller financial compensation. Yet, many argue that a matter as sensitive and self-consuming as pregnancy should not be “bought” and “sold” as if it were any other commodity. While an exchange involving pregnancy is undoubtedly more complex than an exchange concerning the mowing of one’s lawn, does this necessarily make women’s reproductive labor noxious? Could this justify limits on women’s rights over their bodies?
Philosophers fiercely debate the ethics of surrogacy as a market commodity and its societal implications. Some advocate drawing a distinction between reproductive labor and other forms of labor in terms of their marketability, as it is degrading to treat women’s reproductive labor as a market commodity governed by principles of supply and demand. Others also argue that the legality of surrogacy would facilitate exploiting women within highly inegalitarian societies. Thus, this controversy touches upon delicate questions: Does women’s reproductive labor serve as a source of marginalization and exploitation, or of liberation and empowerment? Does the government have a responsibility to regulate the marketization of surrogacy?
Philosopher Elizabeth Anderson argues that the commodification of women’s reproductive labor degrades women and children, making it ethically impermissible. She explains how commercial surrogacy raises new ethical issues, such as reducing the status of children to mere commodities, a comparison she finds most concerning: “The most fundamental calling of parents to their children is to love them,” Anderson (2, 75) asserts, and continues, “children are to be loved and cherished by their parents, not to be used or manipulated by them for merely personal advantage.” Anderson laments that by replacing the norms of parental love with those of the market, commercial surrogacy equates the bond between parent and child to an owner’s claim over his goods. If reproductive labor were to be available on the market, women would conceive and carry children not with the intention of love, she reasons, but with the intention of exchanging them for material gain, thus neglecting children’s best interests. This commercialization reduces the humanity of children as well, by tying their worth to mere attributes, such as height, intelligence, and appearance, thereby undermining the norms of unconditional parental love. Implications of this could include a child’s fear of being “resold,” when failing to display the superficial attributes by which they were chosen, and a sense of loss on behalf of “unsold” siblings.
There are, however, two key critiques to the claim that commercial surrogacy constitutes a commerce that is degrading children. The technological critique has all to do with genetics: if the surrogacy uses women as gestational mothers, and not as genetic ones, a child born out of surrogacy would belong to its genetic mother and should therefore not count as “sold.” The legal critique suggests that the legal parents of a child would be whoever instigated the procedure leading to its birth, and stripping the surrogate mother of any legal claim to the child. These critiques suggest that the supposedly degrading conditions for mothers and children may not warrant legal limits on women’s reproductive labor.
This thought gives way to the work of philosopher Debra Satz, who challenges Anderson’s particular objections to the commodification of surrogacy. While Satz (2010, 117) agrees that women's reproductive labor is troublesome, she deviates from Anderson’s line of reasoning, contesting that “there is no distinction between women’s reproductive labor and other forms of human labor that is relevant to the debate about contract pregnancy.” Thus, she (ibid.) concludes that “the sale of women’s reproductive labor is not ipso facto degrading.” Instead, she asserts that the commodification of women’s reproductive labor proves problematic due to its reinforcement of society’s ever-present gender hierarchies. To this end, Satz (2010, 128) highlights several links between contractual pregnancy and women’s inequality, and posits that contractual pregnancy gives others increased access to and control over women’s bodies and sexuality. Satz details how a woman serving as a surrogate must forfeit control of her body by entering restrictive medical agreements. Often, these agreements dictate the medical treatments she must undergo, the conditions under which she must seek an abortion, and the emotional distance she must maintain from the baby she carries. Women’s loss of bodily autonomy, Satz (2010, 129) claims, justifies the noxiousness of women’s reproductive labor by perpetuating the “[subordination] of women’s interests to those of men, primarily through […] control over women’s sexuality and reproduction.”
There are two main issues, however, that Satz’s argument fails to address. Firstly, her claim that contract pregnancy strips women of bodily autonomy is paradocical: While allowing women to exercise control over their own bodies – by granting them the right to sell their reproductive labor –enables bodily autonomy, the regulation of such control would limit women’s autonomy, thereby violating their agency. Governing oneself is a basic human right, and philosopher Michael Huemer makes a similar argument regarding drug use. “The idea of a right to use drugs derives from the idea that individuals own their own bodies,” Huemer (2004, 424) asserts, and insists that “a person has the right to exercise control over his own body – including the right to decide how it should be used and to exclude others from using it.” This idea of self-ownership matters for women's reproductive labor, as it justifies women’s liberty to use their bodies as they wish, free of external interference.
Furthermore, Satz mistakenly portrays reproductive labor in a negative light, thus failing to acknowledge its potentially empowering nature. For some women, the experience of surrogacy proves deeply meaningful and fulfilling, helping them feel more connected to their own bodies while contributing positively to society. Surrogacy can also be understood as a platform for women to make unique contributions to society and thus reap its unique benefits, in similar manners as members of other genders and other market exchanges do. For instance, in contrast to surrogacy, sperm donation is a largely accepted practice, a disparity Satz (2010, 128) justifies by noting that a man simply sells products of his body or sexuality, instead of control over his body itself. Denying women the same right, however, constitutes discrimination based on their anatomy, thus reinforcing gender inequality. If a society allows men to achieve emotional fulfillment or financial gain from reproductive labor, the equivalent avenue should be kept open to women.
A second issue with Satz’s argument is her failure to acknowledge how inequality is a long-winded, deep-rooted societal issue with far greater contributors than women’s reproductive labor. Satz highlights the risk of women in vulnerable financial situations resorting to reproductive labor for profit, all while lacking sufficient information regarding the effects of this exchange. Yet Satz fails to address that while necessitous women are indeed more likely to partake in a contractual pregnancy, the same could be said of any job involving physical labor: women, along with people of all genders, are more likely to take up dangerous jobs which they would otherwise refuse, if they depend on the financial gain. Women’s reproductive labor is neither to blame for this truth, nor for widespread socio-economic inequality, but is rather a by-product and potential solution to the latter. Surrogacy, when paired with educational programming and support systems to mitigate the risks of insufficient information, can serve as a safe alternative to more harmful or even illegal means of earning money in desperate financial situations.
Both Anderson’s and Satz’s arguments are complex, tense, and contradictory. From Anderson’s perspective, the commodification of children as a side-effect of surrogacy is degrading. By contrast, from Satz’s perspective, it is surrogacy’s perpetuation of existing gender inequalities which renders the practice problematic. What is clear, however, is that arguments against surrogacy are largely paradoxical: legalizing women’s reproductive labor can prove troublesome for women’s bodily autonomy, yet prohibiting surrogacy similarly allows external parties to dictate what a woman can do with her own body. Whereas legalizing surrogacy may lead to exploiting financially vulnerable women who potentially lack proper education, the prohibition of surrogacy would deprive women of financial opportunities and would withhold from women a right allotted to men, who are permitted to profit off of sperm donation.
Hence, it is clear that there is no simple solution or stance to be taken on the matter. Yet while it is difficult to determine the extent to which the state should regulate women’s reproductive labor, it is simple to conclude that it is not the role of the state to dictate how women may use their bodies. The importance of autonomy is central for this conclusion. After all, while it is impossible to fully satisfy all aspects of autonomy when it comes to something this complex, a generalization can be made that including reproductive labor in markets would be the least interfering policy regarding women’s control over their reproductive labor. Governments should nevertheless undertake efforts to ensure proper education, enact support systems, and provide healthcare, and more, to all involved parties.
Works Cited
Anderson, Elizabeth. 1990. “Is Women’s Labor a Commodity?” Philosophy & Public Affairs 19, 71-92
Satz, Debra. 2010. Why Some Things Should Not Be For Sale. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
